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MICKEY V. MICKEY: THE LONG-AWAITED CLARIFICATION IN THE
LANDSCAPE OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS
JENNIFER F. DALENTA
Although the equitable distribution of assets during a marital
dissolution proceeding is governed by Connecticut General Statutes
section 46b-81, the interpretation of this statutory language has resulted in
somewhat inconsistent case law, culminating in the Supreme Court of
Connecticut’s recent decision in Mickey v. Mickey. This Comment traces
the judicial history of equitable distribution in Connecticut by reviewing
several cases preceding the Mickey decision.
These cases have
constructed a two-part test to determine whether property is equitably
distributable. The asset must be either (1) a presently existing and
enforceable right or (2) a contingent interest that is not too speculative.
Next, this Comment discusses the manners in which other jurisdictions
have equitably distributed marital assets. This Comment then analyzes the
Mickey majority and dissenting opinions. While the dissenting opinion
characterizes the party’s interest as presently existing, the majority
opinion describes it as an inchoate property interest that is too speculative
to be equitably distributed.
The Mickey decision is somewhat
controversial because it is factually analogous to a preceding case, yet
asserts a contradictory holding to it. Finally, this Comment concludes by
considering where Connecticut jurisprudence stands today in regard to the
equitable distribution of marital assets in light of the Court’s holding in
Mickey.
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MICKEY V. MICKEY: THE LONG-AWAITED CLARIFICATION IN THE
LANDSCAPE OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS
JENNIFER F. DALENTA*
I. INTRODUCTION
All newlywed couples dream of the white picket fence and the
“happily ever after.” Caught up in the moment, it can be difficult to truly
understand how much is at stake when one commits to marriage and with it
the intertwinement of assets. Standing on the brink of a joint future, a
couple looks ahead with hopes of building a comfortable lifestyle and a
happy family. Over the years, as they work toward these goals, the couple
intermingles their funds and makes major purchases together, such as a
house, its furnishings, and cars. They conduct themselves like a typical
married couple, sharing in the benefits and the burdens of joining their
lives. As the years pass, however, the couple is unable to withstand the
pressures of marriage. The burdens become too cumbersome for the
couple to bear and the “happily ever after” begins to drift out of reach.
Although the couple once functioned as a cohesive unit, their relationship
begins to break down irretrievably. Arguments become more frequent
over everything from the maintenance of the household and the attendant
expenses to proper parenting styles.
Despite repeated efforts at salvaging their relationship, the couple
ultimately decides to begin marital dissolution proceedings. Now the
question becomes: how can the couple untangle all of the assets that have
been tangled between them, giving each individual what is rightly his or
hers? The issues seem endless. Who gets the house? How should the
court address his pension? What about alimony? Child support? Who
will carry the health and dental insurance for the couple and their children?
Who will pay the car loans? Who will pay the credit card bills? While the
extent and complexity of the intertwinement of assets varies on a case by
case basis, the general dilemma remains the same: what does a couple do
when their relationship falls apart?
In Connecticut, the law that governs these family matters is very much
in flux. This case law is particularly important because it defines what
assets are at stake and how to equitably distribute them. In the last year
* Union College, B.A., 2008; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011. I
would like to thank the attorneys at Budlong & Barrett, LLC for their wealth of knowledge and
guidance as I have navigated through the beginning of my legal career. This Comment is dedicated to
my parents and my sister for providing me with unwavering strength, encouragement, and support as I
work toward my goals. The errors contained herein are mine and mine alone.
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alone, the Connecticut Appellate and Supreme Courts have made some
potentially precedential decisions regarding family law.1 Whether these
cases serve as clarification of the current law or a complete overhaul of the
system remains to be seen. Mickey v. Mickey2 is the quintessential
example of the unclear effect of currently decided case law. On one hand,
the case can be interpreted as nothing more than judicial manipulation,
resulting in the return to a prior legal framework. On the other hand, it can
be interpreted as the court’s attempt at redefining one aspect of the family
law regime in order to create a more functional and readily applicable set
of laws.3 The ultimate purpose of these recent cases, whether to serve as a
regression or progression, will not be understood until future cases frame
them. It is this case law that this Comment explores.
On July 21, 2009, the Connecticut Supreme Court ultimately held, in a
3–2 decision, that disability benefits acquired as a result of a disability
incurred after a marriage had been dissolved did not constitute distributable
marital property under section 46b-81 of the Connecticut General Statutes.
This statute dictates that the court may assign property to either party at the
time of marital dissolution.4 In Mickey v. Mickey—the case before the
court that July day—the marriage of the parties was dissolved on
September 21, 2001, after a trial. The trial court entered judgment
dissolving the parties’ marriage and awarded the plaintiff wife forty
percent of the defendant husband’s retirement benefits under chapter 66 of
the Connecticut General Statutes.5 At the time of judgment, the defendant
was employed as a corrections officer for the State of Connecticut at the
Walker facility in Suffield, and was enrolled in the State Employees’
Retirement System (“SERS”) Tier II plan, pursuant to Connecticut law,6
which entitled the defendant to receive certain retirement benefits upon
reaching the age of sixty-five.7 As a corrections officer, the defendant was
also receiving hazardous duty credited service pursuant to Connecticut
law.8 At the time of the original dissolution trial, he had accumulated only
1
See, e.g., Maturo v. Maturo, 995 A.2d 1, 10 (Conn. 2010) (asserting that the child support
guidelines must still be followed even where the parties’ combined income exceeds the threshold
margin recognizing the opportunity for deviations and outside considerations); Crews v. Crews, 989
A.2d 1060, 1070 (Conn. 2010) (articulating a high threshold standard for invalidating pre-nuptial
agreements).
2
Mickey v. Mickey, 974 A.2d 641 (Conn. 2009).
3
See infra Parts IV–V (discussing the debate about the interpretations of the Mickey decision).
4
Mickey, 974 A.2d at 645 & n.2.
5
Id. at 646.
6
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-192e–x (West 2009).
7
Under the normal Tier II plan, a member
who has attained the age sixty-five and has completed ten or more years of vesting
service may retire on his own application on the first day of any future month named
in the application. Benefits shall be payable from that date provided the member is
no longer in state employment.
Id. § 5-192l(a).
8
Id. §§ 5-173, 5-192n.
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fourteen years of credited service, which did not qualify him for hazardous
duty retirement. The defendant, however, did have a vested interest in the
SERS Tier II pension.
Shortly after the dissolution of marriage was finalized, the defendant
was injured on the job. He intervened in a fight between two inmates in
the segregation unit and sustained injuries to his neck, right shoulder, and
lower back. These injuries caused the defendant to miss about seven
weeks of work before they forced him into retirement. Pursuant to his
employment with the state, he was enrolled in the SERS, making him
eligible for both normal retirement benefits and disability retirement
benefits.9 As a result of his debilitating injury, his monthly retirement
benefit payment increased substantially from $990.00 per month to
approximately $2,300.00 per month, and the plaintiff continued to receive
forty percent of the entire benefit received by the defendant, including the
portion attributable to the post-judgment disability, retroactive to the date
of retirement.10
On January 13, 2006, the defendant filed a motion for clarification
with the trial court on two grounds: (1) that the decision, though silent on
the matter, did not intend for the plaintiff to be entitled to a portion of the
defendant’s disability retirement pension since the court specifically noted
its intentions to provide the plaintiff with a share of the defendant’s Tier II
pension or his hazardous duty retirement; and (2) that regardless of
whether the decision intended the plaintiff to be entitled to such funds, the
court was without statutory authority to assign a portion of the defendant’s
disability retirement pension where it was an asset acquired subsequent to
the dissolution.11 The defendant’s motion for clarification was denied.
The trial court also determined that the court had the right to distribute the
defendant’s disability benefits, and that he therefore was not entitled to any
relief.12 The defendant subsequently appealed the case to the appellate
court. He then filed a motion to transfer the case to the Connecticut
Supreme Court, which was granted. The supreme court reversed the trial
court’s holding and ordered that the plaintiff was only entitled to the
defendant’s benefits as they were at the time of the dissolution of
marriage.13 This decision placed Mickey at the forefront of equitable
distribution law in Connecticut.14
9

Id.
The benefit also immediately vested at the time of disability, rather than being collectible at the
time of the defendant’s retirement. Mickey, 974 A.2d at 646.
11
Id. at 645.
12
Id. at 647.
13
Id. at 664.
14
In response, the plaintiff filed for reconsideration en banc, which was denied. This denial
suggested that Mickey would remain good, and relevant, law, as the court decided that there was clearly
no need to rehear arguments on the issue with a second opportunity for review.
10
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This Comment proceeds in five Parts. Part II addresses the extent of
the court’s jurisdiction to equitably distribute marital assets through a
broad statutory mandate and traces the judicial history of equitable
distribution in Connecticut by reviewing several cases preceding Mickey.
Part III discusses the manners in which other jurisdictions have equitably
distributed marital assets. Part IV analyzes the Mickey majority decision
and the dissenting opinion. Part V addresses the future implications of the
Mickey decision and whether it serves to overrule the court’s preceding
decisions on the matter. Finally, Part VI concludes by addressing the issue
of where Connecticut jurisprudence stands today in regard to the equitable
distribution of marital assets in light of the court’s somewhat controversial
and ambiguous holding in Mickey.
II. THE COURT’S JURISDICTION TO EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTE MARITAL
ASSETS AND THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION IN CONNECTICUT
The Supreme Court of Connecticut noted in Smith v. Smith that “it
is . . . well settled that ‘[c]ourts have no inherent power to transfer property
from one spouse to another; instead, that power must rest upon an enabling
statute.’”15 As such, in the context of a dissolution of marriage action, the
courts derive their authority to determine what constitutes property that is
subject to equitable distribution from section 46b-81 of the Connecticut
General Statutes. The relevant language of the statute is as follows:
At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a
marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint
under section 46b-45, the superior court may assign to either
the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.
The court may pass title to real property to either party or to a
third person or may order the sale of such real property,
without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in
the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the
decree into effect.16
The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that this statutory grant of
jurisdiction extends to property “possessed during [the parties’]
marriage.”17 In this respect, the overarching belief that governs the
equitable distribution of marital assets is that marriage constitutes more
than simply a romantic relationship, but can also be considered an

15
Smith v. Smith, 752 A.2d 1023, 1029 (Conn. 1999) (quoting Passamano v. Passamano, 634
A.2d 891, 893 n.4 (Conn. 1993)).
16
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81(a) (West 2009).
17
Smith, 752 A.2d at 1030.
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economic partnership.
Over the past two decades, the Connecticut judicial system has
struggled with locating a bright line that differentiates between divisible
and non-divisible assets in an effort to unscramble the ownership of
property during a dissolution of marriage proceeding designed to give each
spouse what is equitably his or hers.
The Connecticut Supreme Court began its effort to narrow and
interpret the statutory language by determining what did not constitute
marital property subject to equitable distribution in Rubin v. Rubin.19 In
that case, the plaintiff was the residuary beneficiary of a revocable inter
vivos trust created by his mother.20 At the time of the marital dissolution
action, the trust had not yet vested.
The court declined to adopt the position that a contingent award of
expected property could be upheld as a property transfer sanctioned under
section 46b-81.21 It concluded that the equitable distribution of marital
assets did not encompass contingent transfers of expected property and that
it would not extend the statutory language in this way.22 The court noted
that it was the legislature’s responsibility to amend the statute accordingly
if it desired the statute to encompass such scenarios.23 In this respect, the
court stated that “[t]o uphold the award of a share of an expectancy as
contingent alimony might fairly be viewed as sanctioning in a different
guise an assignment of property not then within the jurisdiction of the
court, which we have concluded § 46b-81 does not authorize.”24 In sum,
the court concluded that it was outside the scope of the statute’s control to
divide property that the parties did not possess during their marriage, but
that they obtained after the dissolution was finalized.25
Less than a decade later, the Connecticut Supreme Court was again
faced with the issue of how to equitably distribute the parties’ marital
assets. In Krafick v. Krafick, the court had to determine whether vested
pension benefits constituted property for the purpose of equitable
distribution.26 In that case, the couple had been married for over thirty
years and had seven children.27 The plaintiff wife was a homemaker for
the majority of the marriage, eventually returning to work part-time in a
18
Grace Ganz Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers’
Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutions: An Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 1250, 1251 (1986).
19
527 A.2d 1184 (Conn. 1987).
20
Id. at 1186.
21
Id. at 1187.
22
Id. at 1188.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 1190.
25
Id. at 1187–88.
26
Krafick v. Krafick, 663 A.2d 365, 366 (Conn. 1995).
27
Id.
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bakery. The defendant worked as a teacher, but retired after thirty-four
years of service, shortly after the parties’ marriage was dissolved.29 As a
result, the defendant’s pension did not vest until after the parties’
dissolution of marriage was finalized.
Since the word “property” was not defined in the relevant legislation,
the court began its analysis in Krafick by defining it, utilizing the common
understanding of the term. Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary’s very
broad definition of property, which encompassed everything that is the
subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible,
visible or invisible, real or personal, the court concluded that “[n]othing in
the legislative history of § 46b-81 indicates an intent to narrow the plain
meaning of ‘property’ from its ordinarily broad and comprehensive scope.
Indeed, the term ‘property’ has been broadly defined elsewhere in the
General Statutes.”30 The court reasoned that the un-matured pension
benefits were also considered property because they represented an
enforceable contractual right.31 Although it was contingent on future
events, the court held that it constituted more than a mere expectancy
because there was a strong likelihood that the pension would vest.32
After establishing that pension benefits were equitably distributable
property under section 46b-81, the court turned to a public policy argument
to support this finding. It reasoned that since pension benefits were widely
recognized as one of the most valuable assets that parties develop over the
course of their marriage, it would be unfair and contrary to the purpose of
the statute to strip the non-employee spouse of the value of the retirement
asset by precluding the court from evaluating its worth prior to
adjudicating the property rights of the parties.33 Based on its finding of a
broad definition of property, as well as its strong policy convictions, the
court concluded that the term “property,” as used in section 46b-81,
included a right, which is “contractual in nature, to receive vested pension
benefits in the future.”34 The court found that the trial court had abused its
discretion by refusing to assign an appropriate valuation to the pension
benefits, and by treating the pension as a mere expectancy rather than
equitably distributable property; the court remanded the case to the trial
court to make such an assignment.35
The law of equitable distribution of contingent property during a
28

Id.
Id. at 367.
30
Id. at 371; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-278a (West 2009) (defining property for
purposes of attachment as “any present or future interest in real or personal property, goods, chattels or
choses in action, whether such is vested or contingent”).
31
Krafick, 663 A.2d at 372.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 371–72.
34
Id. at. 372–73.
35
Id. at 376.
29
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dissolution of marriage proceeding continued to develop in the following
years. In Simmons v. Simmons, the Supreme Court of Connecticut had to
decide if something as intangible and invaluable as a medical degree
constituted property that could be equitably distributed as a marital asset.36
In this case, the critical problem was that the couple had few economic
assets.37 As such, “[t]he degree, with its potential for increased earning
power, [was], therefore, the only thing of real economic value to the
parties.”38 The defendant relied on the court’s expansive interpretation of
property in Krafick to argue that an advanced degree obtained during the
marriage constituted property.39 The plaintiff, however, argued that a
medical degree could not be distributed as property because it had “no
inherent value independent of the holder and [did] not fit within the
statutory definition of property.”40 The court reasoned that, while it did not
retreat from the definition of property espoused in Krafick, the term
certainly had limits.41
The court stated that whether an interest could be considered equitably
distributable property under section 46b-81 depended on whether it was
presently existing or a mere expectancy, as section 46b-81 did not apply to
mere expectancies.42 The court analogized the medical degree to the
interest in an anticipated inheritance, which is not considered property
under section 46b-81.43 Conversely, the court distinguished the medical
degree from interests like vested pension benefits, which seem like
expectancies because they are deferred compensation, yet are still presently
existing, enforceable contract rights that represent more than a mere
expectancy despite the fact that they are contingent on future events.44 The
court went on to note that “[t]he enforceable rights inherent in a vested
pension make it distinctly different from the expectation of possible
benefits afforded by an advanced degree.”45 In this respect, the medical
degree did not entail a presently existing, enforceable right. Thus, the
possibility of future earnings did not constitute a presently existing right,
but a mere expectancy, and therefore, could not be subject to equitable
distribution.
By the late 1990s, the court had begun to carve out a digestible
paradigm for understanding what types of property were subject to
equitable distribution during a dissolution of marriage action. The
36

Simmons v. Simmons, 708 A.2d 949, 951 (Conn. 1998).
Id. at 952.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 953–54.
40
Id. at 953.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 953–54.
43
Id. at 954.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 954–55.
37
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property landscape, however, was further complicated by the Supreme
Court of Connecticut’s analysis in Bornemann v. Bornemann.46 In that
case, the defendant husband was employed full-time and had extensive
employment experience in management and lobbying, while the plaintiff
wife was primarily a homemaker, taking care of the parties’ special needs
child.47 Not only did the defendant make a substantial salary, but he also
received stock options through his employer.48 The defendant appealed the
dissolution judgment, claiming that the trial court erred in distributing the
unvested fourth and fifth flights of his stock options.49
After reviewing its recent rationales and decisions in Simmons and
Krafick, the court analogized the stock options to the unvested pension
benefits, finding that the defendant’s interest in the options amounted to
more than a mere expectancy.50 The defendant entered into a termination
agreement with his employer that gave him the right to remain classified as
an employee for a certain period of time so as to allow him to exercise the
fourth and fifth flights of his stock options, which remained unvested at the
time of the agreement.51 The defendant did not have to engage in any
affirmative acts in order to retain the options, but only had to refrain from
certain actions for a specific period of time.52 Although the fourth and fifth
flights were not presently exercisable at the time of the dissolution, and
certain circumstances could have resulted in their forfeiture, the court held
that the stock options still constituted more than a mere expectancy
because maintaining them only required passive activity.53 It reasoned that
under the circumstances, “the restrictions qualitatively were more closely
analogous to other contingencies typically associated with deferred
benefits,” like pensions.54 The court also relied on the trend in other
jurisdictions, which had been to treat unvested stock options as property on
the grounds that they produced a contractual right, a valuable form of
intangible property.55 In support of this reliance, the court noted that
should the employer attempt to withdraw his offer, the employee would
have a potential action in contract against him.56
Rather than determining ownership based on when the options actually
vested, the court apportioned the unvested stock options according to when
they were earned, ensuring that the plaintiff was entitled to fair, but not
46

752 A.2d 978 (Conn. 1998).
Id. at 982.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 983–84.
50
Id. at 984–86.
51
Id. at 985.
52
Id. at 991.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 986.
56
Id. at 985.
47
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overreaching compensation. Further, the court considered the purpose of
the options, and whether it was to compensate the employee for past or
present services, or to create an incentive for future services.58 In this case,
the unvested stock options were part of the defendant’s compensation for
services rendered in the past, and therefore, constituted marital property
that was subject to division because, as previously noted, they served as
deferred compensation which, if acquired contemporaneously with his
normal compensation, would have contributed to the marital household.59
This decision further developed the concept of property as defined
under section 46b-81, and required the court to explore and dissect the
ambiguous area between mere expectancies and presently existing
interests.60 The new rule that seemed to emerge from Bornemann was that
any property which established a contractual right, including unvested
stock options, could not be considered a mere expectancy, and therefore,
could be considered an interest that was sufficient to constitute property
under Connecticut’s equitable distribution statute.
The supreme court’s next case on the issue of equitable distribution
was quite complicated. In Lopiano v. Lopiano, the plaintiff husband had
served in Vietnam and then founded his own company, which the parties
later sold.61 Over the next several years, the plaintiff battled addictions to
cocaine and alcohol, had an affair with another woman, and was diagnosed
with post traumatic stress disorder.62 After being arrested and receiving inpatient care for his mental illness and addiction, he returned to the
workforce as a construction worker in New York.63 The defendant
supported the plaintiff throughout his struggles, reconciling with him on at
least one occasion, and helping to keep the business operating when the
defendant was incapable of doing so on his own.64
After the plaintiff returned to work, he had an accident and sustained
severe physical injuries, which resulted in his complete physical
disability.65 The plaintiff then pursued a negligence action, which he won,
leaving him with an award of $800,000.66 The defendant continued to be
supportive after the accident by assisting the plaintiff with his relocation to
a hospital near her, visiting and caring for him on a daily basis.67 The trial
court found that the defendant was in good health and making a decent
57

Id. at 989.
Id. at 987–88.
59
Id. at 991.
60
Id. at 984–85.
61
Lopiano v. Lopiano, 752 A.2d 1000, 1005 (Conn. 1998).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1005–06.
65
Id. at 1005.
66
Id.
67
Id.
58

960

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:949

living as a medical office secretary, and the plaintiff survived comfortably
off of Social Security disability, veteran’s disability benefits, and worker’s
compensation benefits.68
The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in including the portion
of his personal injury award received as compensation for pain and
suffering and the portion that served as compensation for post-dissolution
lost wages as property subject to distribution under section 46b-81.69 The
plaintiff, however, also recognized that the judgment in his personal injury
case clearly amounted to a presently existing property interest in a specific
award that fell within the realm of section 46b-81.70 The court noted that
there were three different approaches among the various jurisdictions that
it could follow when determining how to divide personal injury judgments
for the purposes of distribution in a marital dissolution proceeding.71
The first was to “classify any such award or settlement as the personal
and entirely separate property of the injured spouse.”72 The second
approach required the assessment of the purpose of the compensation in
order to determine whether the property was “marital” or “personal.”73
The third approach, and the more modern trend, asserted that any award
acquired during the marriage should be deemed marital property regardless
of its underlying purpose.74 None of these approaches, however, directly
mirrored the way that Connecticut approached such dilemmas.
Instead, the court recognized that “[r]ather than narrow the plain
meaning of the term ‘property’ from its ordinarily comprehensive scope, in
enacting § 46b-81, ‘the legislature acted to expand the range of resources
subject to the trial court’s power of division, and did not intend that
property should be given a narrow construction.’”75 It defined property,
for purposes of section 46b-81 as:
[T]he term commonly used to denote everything which is the
subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or
intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything
that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up
wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right
and interest, and includes real and personal property,
easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments.76
Simply because the property belonged to one of the parties did not
68

Id. at 1006.
Id.
Id. at 1009.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1010.
75
Id. at 1008 (quoting Bornemann v. Bornemann, 752 A.2d 978, 984 (1998)).
76
Id. at 1007–08 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69
70
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guarantee that he or she would be the ultimate owner, as the legislature
gave the court broad discretion in arriving at an equitable distribution of
the marital assets.77 In the end, the court found that it could subject the
plaintiff’s personal injury compensation to equitable distribution because
the injury for which the award was ultimately given occurred during the
parties’ marriage, thereby placing it in the realm of distributable property.78
In fact, in footnote five of the decision, the court recognized that the
paramount question in determining whether an asset is distributable
property is whether the interest is earned prior to or subsequent to the date
of dissolution.79 The implication from this language is quite clear: assets
earned prior to the dissolution, even those representing compensation for
future services, constituted marital property, while assets earned after the
date of dissolution did not.
In his dissent, Justice McDonald raised an interesting point that was
later used as support for the majority’s finding in Mickey. He stated, “[i]t
is difficult to conceive how compensation for pain and suffering and future
lost wages can be considered fruits of the marriage, as they do not arise out
of the marriage and are independent of it.”80 Justice Berdon, also
dissenting, argued that following the court’s reasoning in Bornemann,
unvested stock options constituted marital property because they were
earned prior to the date of dissolution. Further, he argued that the plaintiff
in the instant case had not earned the portion of the award that pertained to
his future pain and suffering, that he did not experience that anguish during
the course of the marriage, and that the relevant damages were not
intended to compensate him for his past agony.81
In the end, however, the majority found that although the plaintiff may
suffer from the repercussions of the injury after the marital dissolution was
finalized, the plaintiff was injured while the marriage was still intact,
thereby allowing for the personal injury compensation to be considered
property subject to equitable distribution because it represented a then
presently existing property interest of a determinable value.82
The property distribution landscape was further complicated by the
Connecticut Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. Smith. In that case, the
parties held many different professional positions during their marriage.
After reviewing the parties’ financial affidavits, the trial court concluded
that the defendant had acquired all of her assets through her own efforts
and investments with the exception of $275,000 that she received in the
77

Id. at 1010–11.
Id. at 1011.
79
Id. at 1009 n.5.
80
Id. at 1022 (McDonald, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
81
Id. at 1019 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
82
Id. at 1011.
78
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settlement of a lawsuit against her employer. Basing its decision on the
fact that the parties were only married for four out of the five years of the
defendant’s employment from which the settlement claim arose, the trial
court awarded the plaintiff $75,000 of the $275,000 total settlement
received by the defendant.84
In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the court reiterated the long
standing notion that the purpose of property division pursuant to a
dissolution proceeding was “to unscramble existing marital property” and
provide equitable shares to each party.85 Further, “an attempt to divide
expected property [was] outside the scope of the statutes because it [did]
not divide the property that the parties possessed during their marriage.”86
The court ultimately determined that the trial court reasonably found that
the defendant’s claim against her employer was an inchoate marital asset at
the point of equitable distribution; through the defendant’s work at the
company, she had already earned an enforceable right to the compensation
before the dissolution of marriage was finalized. The court went on to
explain in dicta that the fact that the plaintiff may not have helped in the
acquisition of the settlement “[did] not vitiate the fact that the right to the
asset had been earned mostly during the parties’ marriage,”87 thereby
making it subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution.
The court also addressed the issue of the trial court’s statutory
authority to divide after-acquired assets, finding that the trial court lacked
the requisite statutory authority to divide assets acquired after a marriage
had formally ended through a dissolution proceeding.88 Another property
dispute arose between the parties over a potential trust estate. The trial
court entered an order retaining continuing jurisdiction for several years
after the entry of judgment over any interest the plaintiff could have in a
family trust, for the express purpose of distributing the asset if and when it
was received.89 The plaintiff appealed this decision, claiming that the trial
court exceeded its jurisdiction in retaining jurisdiction over the family
trust.90 Maintaining consistency with its ruling on the defendant’s
employment settlement, the court reversed the decision of the trial court,
reasoning that “the marital estate divisible pursuant to § 46b-81 refers to
interests already acquired, not to expected or unvested interests, or to
interests that the court has not yet quantified.”91
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Just a year later, the appellate court was faced with an issue that
required it to apply the developing property distribution paradigm. After
eighteen years of marriage, the parties in Hopfer v. Hopfer filed for a
dissolution of their marriage.92 The defendant worked at a subsidiary of
Viacom and upon the company’s announcement that it would be selling
this subsidiary, the defendant began to worry about the security of his
position under the prospect of new management.93 The defendant’s
employment with a new company as the chief information officer began
approximately two months before the court rendered judgment in the
parties’ dissolution of marriage action.94 The defendant received a base
salary as well as shares of stock, which vested at a rate of twenty-five
percent per year with an initial vesting date nearly a year after their
dissolution of marriage was finalized.95
The court began its analysis by distinguishing the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s holding in Bornemann from the instant case. The court
noted that “in Bornemann, the stock options were found to be awarded for
past services rendered.”96 Conversely, in the instant case, the court
affirmed the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s unvested stock
options were compensation for services, which would be rendered postjudgment, and were therefore not marital property subject to distribution
during the marital dissolution.97 The court concluded that it was not an
error for the trial court to have excluded the options as marital property
where they were an incentive for future services provided, not a reward for
past services rendered.98
As a result of this decision and its predecessors, the cases’ holdings
slowly began to paint a comprehensible picture of the judicial landscape
surrounding the equitable distribution of marital assets by clearly
distinguishing between what did and did not constitute property under the
applicable statute.
The following year, however, Bender v. Bender quickly muddied the
seemingly clear waters of equitable distribution jurisprudence. In that
case, the parties had been married for over twenty years and had four
children together.99 At the time of the dissolution, the defendant had been
employed as a firefighter for nineteen years.100 The defendant was entitled
to a pension if he reached twenty-five years of service.101 Therefore, at the
92
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time of the dissolution of marriage action, his benefits were unvested,
except in regards to disability. If the defendant were to leave service
before the twenty-five years, and not as a result of a disability, he would
receive only the contributions that he had made to the pension plan to
date.102 The Supreme Court of Connecticut granted certiorari on the issue
of whether unvested pension benefits could be considered property under
section 46b-81, thereby subjecting them to equitable distribution during a
marital dissolution proceeding.103
The defendant claimed that the unvested pension benefits were not
property under the applicable statute, while the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant’s interest in the unvested pension benefits was not a mere
expectancy, but rather, constituted a presently existing property interest,
thereby allowing for its subjection to equitable distribution.104 The court
first noted that equity must rely on substance rather than mere form,
finding that since nineteen of the twenty-five years necessary for the
vesting of the defendant’s pension benefits were years in which the parties
were marital partners, that the unvested pension benefits still constituted
marital property subject to equitable distribution under the statute.105 In
analyzing the foregoing decisional law, the court identified the common
theme in determining whether a certain interest was property subject to
division: whether the party’s “expectation of a benefit attached to that
interest was too speculative to constitute divisible marital property.”106
The court articulated the following test:
[I]n determining whether a certain interest is property subject
to equitable distribution under § 46b-81, we look to whether
a party’s expectation of a benefit attached to that interest was
too speculative to constitute divisible marital property. . . . In
cases in which an interest was so speculative as to constitute
a mere expectancy, we concluded that it was not property
subject to equitable distribution; . . . whereas, in cases in
which an interest was not so speculative as to constitute a
mere expectancy, but rather a presently existing interest in
property, we treated it as property subject to equitable
distribution.107
Extrapolating from this test, the court held that the defendant’s
unvested pension benefits were not too speculative to be considered
property subject to equitable distribution under the statute, explaining:
102
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Our conclusion that the defendant’s unvested pension
benefits are not a mere expectancy is consistent with the
nature of retirement benefits, and the fact that employers and
employees treat retirement benefits as property in the
workplace. . . . [P]ension benefits represent a form of
deferred compensation for services rendered . . . . Most
retirement plans permit the employee to take a reduction in
present salary in exchange for increased future retirement
benefits . . . . If retirement benefits were truly only [a mere
expectancy], employers and employees would not treat them
as a substitute for present wages.108
Such a movement away from precedents through the creation of a less
flexible test with defined parameters was presumably grounded in
productive and positive intentions. A potential rationale for such a test was
to impose something of an immediate offset method, which would sever
the parties’ economic ties and prevent further judicial oversight of the
matter. In the end, Bender’s legacy lived on through its establishment of a
two-part test to determine equitably distributable property. Either the
property must be: (1) presently existing and legally enforceable property
rights; or (2) contingent or unvested property that is not too speculative in
nature.109
In the dissent, Justice Zarella argued that the majority misconstrued
both the statute and the applicable case law, which indicated that only
those interests in which a party had a presently existing, enforceable right
could be deemed property subject to equitable distribution under section
46b-81.110 Further, he asserted that the case law demonstrated that if the
interest was merely an expectancy, it could not be subject to equitable
distribution, considering that there was a risk that the holder of the
unvested or future benefits could never receive them.111 Justice Zarella
continued in his dissent to acknowledge that such expectancies should not
be ignored in calculating the equitable distribution of the marital assets, but
could be accounted for when considering the parties’ ability to acquire
income in the future.112 As such, Justice Zarella argued that when a
pension benefit became vested and was in payment status, the trial court
could treat it as a changed circumstance that would warrant the alteration
of the alimony award.113 For him, the solution was not simply to change
the legal framework to prevent continued judicial oversight, but to
108
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maintain the bright line rule articulated in both the statute and the case law,
a decision which could lead to future litigation down the road, but would
operate harmoniously with precedent. His staunch opposition to the
court’s holding in this case would later serve as the catalyst to facilitate the
Mickey majority decision, now the binding authority in Connecticut.
After a six-year lull, the Appellate Court of Connecticut found itself
addressing the same issue that had plagued the Supreme Court of
Connecticut for over a decade, that of the equitable distribution of marital
assets. In Czarzasty v. Czarzasty, the parties had been married for nearly
fifteen years.114 Throughout their marriage the wife had worked for Merrill
Lynch in various positions while the husband initially worked as the
president of a construction company.115 When the company dissolved, the
wife helped her husband obtain a job at Merrill Lynch and the couple
began to work together as an investment team, with the parties splitting
their commissions seventy-thirty between the wife and husband,
respectively.116 The couple remained an investment team until 2001. At
the time of the dissolution, both parties were still employed at Merrill
Merrill Lynch provided various financial plans for its
Lynch.117
employees, including the investment certificate plan, a performance-based
deferred compensation award in the amount of $100,000, which was
awarded after ten years of employment with Merrill Lynch as long as the
employee met a specific production goal during that ten-year period.118 By
the time of their marital dissolution, the wife had already received her
certificate, and the defendant was projected to receive his award in two
years, and was on target to meet his production goal.119
The trial court somewhat simplistically determined that, “because the
certificate was intended to procure ten years of employment,” and “because
two years of that period would take place post-divorce,” the certificate had
been eighty percent earned.120 In this respect, the court found that the
husband’s interest in the certificate was marital property subject to
distribution under section 46b-81.121 The husband subsequently appealed
the court’s finding.122
In reviewing the previous case law that had addressed this issue, the
appellate court found that there was a nuanced and sometimes subtle
difference between expected property, which was currently nonexistent
114
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and could never exist, and a sufficiently concrete and reasonable
probability that the property would vest.123 Under a modified version of
the Bender test, the court stated that:
If the likelihood [wa]s not too speculative, then it [wa]s
property subject to valuation and distribution. . . . [T]he trial
court in this instance did not comment on whether the party
had a presently existing contractual right to the future receipt
of the asset in question. Rather, the court made an
assessment of the probability that the defendant would, in
fact, receive the asset.124
The appellate court deferred to the trial court’s finding that the certificate
was property subject to equitable distribution because it was more than a
mere expectancy, as there was a strong probability that it would vest within
two years.125
The final case that defined the equitable distribution regime in
Connecticut prior to Mickey was decided ten weeks after Czarzasty. In the
summer of 2007, the appellate court rendered its decision in Ranfone v.
Ranfone.126 In that case, the parties had been married for nearly twenty
years and had one child.127 The trial court had divided the marital assets by
ordering the defendant husband to pay alimony to the plaintiff wife while
also sustaining a health insurance plan for her during the period of
payment.128 Among other divisions, the court awarded the plaintiff fifty
percent of the value of the defendant’s pension, “valued and payable to her
as of the date that he first bec[ame] eligible to begin collecting his share of
the pension. . . .”129
The defendant appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the court
did not err in dividing the pension benefits, but that it should have only
included contributions made until the date of the marital dissolution;
therefore, the court improperly awarded the plaintiff too much of the
defendant’s pension benefits.130 The defendant further cited Bornemann in
arguing that assets must be earned during the marriage to constitute marital
property subject to equitable distribution during a dissolution
proceeding.131
Relying on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s previous holding in
Bender, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s holding, stating that the
123
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case law interpreting what could properly be considered marital property
pursuant to section 46b-81 considered the “equitable purpose of [the]
statutory distribution scheme, rather than . . . mechanically applied rules of
property law.”132 Therefore, although there were undeniable differences
between the situation in Bender and that in the instant case, as the Bender
court would presumably have ruled in the opposite manner by only
awarding the plaintiff the part of the pension that coincided with the
marriage, the court analogized the cases and noted that the broad language
of Bender allowed for judicial discretion in determining what constituted
marital property.133 This decision opened the door for some major changes
in the dissolution of marriage arena, and it would only take a matter of a
few years for them to come to fruition.
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ TREATMENT OF DISABILITY BENEFITS
Most jurisdictions have attempted to create bright line rules to guide
the equitable distribution of marital assets.134 Due to advanced technology
and unanticipated types of property, however, maintaining a universally
applicable standard has been nearly impossible. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court held in Thompson v. Thompson that since disability
benefits serve as compensation for loss of future earning capacity, they
should not constitute a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.135 In
that case, the two parties filed for divorce after a long-term marriage.136
Throughout their marriage, the plaintiff was a homemaker while the
defendant worked as a firefighter until obtaining subsequent employment
after a work-related disability.137 The trial court initially awarded the
plaintiff sixty-five percent of the marital assets, including sixty-five
percent of the defendant’s disability pension.138 The supreme court held
that because disability benefits compensate a wage earner for lost earning
capacity, the benefits do not constitute part of the marital estate.139 The
court further held, however, that the lower courts may consider disability
benefits as income for the purposes of determining alimony and child
support awards.140 Academics have criticized the court’s holding in
Thompson on the grounds that the determination of what constitutes
property subject to equitable distribution during a marital dissolution
action should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, rather than by creating
132
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141

generally applicable rules.
This case is analogous to the Supreme Court
of Connecticut’s holding in Mickey.
Another Rhode Island Supreme Court ruling a few years later further
advanced the law of equitable distribution of marital assets. In Giha v.
Giha, the court held that lottery ticket winnings that arose during the
interlocutory period of a divorce were subject to equitable distribution as a
marital asset.142 Since the final dissolution decree had not been officially
ordered, the court held that the parties were still legally married and
therefore obligated to disclose changes in financial circumstances.143
Academics have applauded this decision because it “protects spouses from
nondisclosure and ensures that lottery [winnings] occurring prior to
the final divorce decree are marital assets subject to . . . equitable
distribution. . . .”144 The holding created a bright-line rule that any assets
obtained prior to the dissolution of marriage could be subject to equitable
distribution, while those obtained after dissolution presumably were not.
Mickey also seems to create something of a bright-line rule for the
application of the statute through the court’s use of the “fruits of the
marriage” language.145
Only a few states away, the New York Court of Appeals was also
faced with the issue of equitable distribution in DeLuca v. DeLuca.146 In
that case, the parties had been married for over thirty years.147 The
husband worked for the New York City Police Department (NYPD),
advancing to the rank of Detective, First Grade, while the wife was a
homemaker.148 Before the dissolution of marriage judgment was issued,
the husband retired from the NYPD, after thirty-one years of service, and
began receiving both his regular pension benefits and his Police Superior
Officer’s Variable Supplement Fund (PSOVSF) benefits.149 The appellate
division found that only the husband’s regular pension benefits were
marital property subject to distribution.150 The New York courts had
previously stated that, “[i]n the context of marital property, pensions have
been described as ‘contract rights of value, received in lieu of higher
141
Janet A. Mesrobian, Comment, Disabling Equitable Distribution: Disability Pension Not
Subject to Equitable Distribution as Marital Asset—Thompson v. Thompson, 642 A.2d 1160 (R.I.
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compensation, which would otherwise have enhanced either marital assets
or the marital standard of living.’”151 In the instant case, however, the
appellate division reasoned that the PSOVSF benefits were not the type
that accrued over time nor were they received in lieu of higher
compensation which would have enhanced the marital assets or standard of
living.152 Instead, they were the type that became available only upon the
occurrence of two conditions: (1) an officer had to be a member of the
benefit fund, and (2) he or she had to retire after at least twenty years of
service.153
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the appellate division’s
decision, instead holding that a non-pension supplemental benefit received
by a New York police officer was marital property subject to equitable
distribution in a divorce settlement, notwithstanding the fact that the
officer did not become eligible to receive the benefit until after the divorce
action commenced.154 The court reasoned that in light of the broad
conception of marital property, “vesting” was not a determinative factor.155
Further, the court noted that, based on previous cases, compensation
obtained after the marital dissolution for services rendered during the
marriage was deemed marital property.156 Although this benefit was not
related to a pension, it was awarded to the husband for past services
rendered. Therefore, rather than following the traditional rule that benefits
are not divisible unless they have vested, the court adopted a new standard
that if benefits could be interpreted as compensation for past services that
were rendered during the marriage, at least a portion would be subject to
equitable distribution regardless of the vesting date. Interestingly, the
court’s opinion in DeLuca, although not mandatory authority, operates
harmoniously with the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Mickey, as
the defendant’s disability benefits were not compensation for past services
rendered but rather functioned as payment for future lost wages resulting
from his post-dissolution debilitating injury.
IV. ANALYZING THE MICKEY MAJORITY DECISION AND THE
DISSENTING OPINION
At the time that Mickey entered the judicial landscape, the statutory
grant of jurisdiction under Connecticut General Statutes section 46b-81
extended to property “possessed during [the] marriage”157 and to property
151
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interests that were not “too speculative to constitute divisible marital
property.”158 In other words, section 46b-81 applied to interests that were
more than mere expectancies, but that were not necessarily currently
vested entities. The case law prior to Bender seemed to consistently
establish the general rule that assets earned prior to the date of dissolution,
even those representing compensation for future services, constituted
marital property that was subject to distribution, while assets earned after
the date of dissolution did not.159 Bender, however, quickly turned this
easily applicable standard on its head, and seemed to create a second step
for consideration based on the speculative nature of the contingent asset.160
After the decision in Mickey, the looming question remained whether the
“too speculative” rule that was memorialized in Bender was still good law.
In the Mickey decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court appeared to revert
to the same analytical framework that it had used in Lopiano and the other
related cases prior to Bender. In this respect, it was not surprising that the
author of the majority opinion for Mickey, Justice Zarella, was also the
author of the dissenting opinion in Bender.161
The plaintiff in Mickey first relied on the court’s holding in a previous
case, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Pondi-Salik,162 to assert that the
defendant’s disability benefits were subject to equitable distribution in
accordance with section 46b-81, thereby serving as a dispositive
precedent.163 In response, the court articulated the integral differences
between Pondi-Salik and the instant case.164 It noted that, although the
disability retirement-benefit statute at issue was the same in both cases, the
“significant factual and procedural differences between the two cases
render[ed] Pondi-Salik inapposite.”165 Pondi-Salik lacked any discussion
of the speculative nature of disability benefits or the characterization of
such benefits prior to a disability.166 Therefore, Pondi-Salik was not
dispositive and the court was able to assess the legitimacy of the
defendant’s other claims before rendering a decision.167
After describing the relevant statutes, the applicable terminology, and
the overarching principles that guide equitable-distribution jurisprudence,
the court turned to the defendant’s argument that his disability benefits
were too speculative to be considered marital property subject to equitable
distribution under section 46b-81. The defendant asserted that the
158
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disability benefits were not marital property because they were not
acquired until after the dissolution of marriage, and because they
functioned as compensation for lost wages, which were attributable to
services that would be performed post-dissolution.168 The court began by
assessing the judicial history, particularly in terms of its characterization of
property. It noted that the initial framework created a stark division
between presently existing property and mere expectancies—the former as
distributable and the latter as immune from statutory subjection.169
After providing a brief overview of the factual background and
procedural posture of Mickey’s predecessors, the court turned to its
decision in Bender—which did not on its face seem to abide by the same
scheme—stating that the decision “updated this traditional, fairly rigid
dichotomy by establishing a more nuanced approach to defining property
interests under § 46b-81.”170 Going further in its explanation of Bender,
the court added:
Consistent with our time-honored approach, we reiterated
that presently enforceable rights, based on either property or
contract principles, are sufficient to cause property to be
divisible. Where Bender broke new ground was in its
recognition that such rights are not the “sine qua non of
‘property’ under § 46b-81.” In building on our prior cases,
we expanded our notion of property under § 46b-81,
recognizing that there is a spectrum of interests that do not fit
comfortably into our traditional scheme and yet should be
available in equity for courts to distribute.171
Arguably, the court’s commentary could be interpreted as an excuse for its
betrayal of the well-ingrained decisional framework for determining
distributable property, as the court’s decision in Mickey arguably overruled
rather than supplemented its decision in Bender. As such, one could find
that the court used this language to create a smokescreen of harmony
between the arguably contradictory holdings, which hid Mickey’s
underlying function of overruling Bender. On the other hand, one could
also argue that Mickey served to further develop the Bender test. Part V
will further analyze this debate.
Regardless of outside interpretation, the court claimed to rely on the
two-part test that was set forth in Bender, which preserved the traditional
definition of property, while also “carving out a middle ground,
encompassing some inchoate property interests that would have been
168

Id.
Id. at 656.
170
Id. at 659.
171
Id. at 659–60 (citation omitted).
169

2011]

MICKEY V. MICKEY

973

excluded from the definition of distributable property under the older
regime.”172 This “inchoate property” referred to the consideration of
contingent unmatured interests that were not too speculative in nature.173
The court asserted that the addition of a second step provided a measure of
flexibility that would prevent unfair results.174 To clarify, in Bender, the
court found that although the defendant’s unvested pension benefits were
contingent, they were “sufficiently certain to constitute divisible property”
because they could be quantified.175 In its attempt to reconcile Bender and
Mickey, the court went on to explain that Bender articulated the second
step of the property test, whereby the speculative nature of the property
interest had to be assessed in conjunction with other factors—like, for
instance, in Bender, the fact that such benefits normally were treated as
property because they constituted a trade-off for higher wages—to
determine if the property was subject to distribution under section 46b81.176
After the court explained its rationale for extending the definition of
property beyond the statutory language to create an even broader
interpretation, it applied the analysis to Mickey. Justice Zarella quickly
dismissed the possibility that the defendant’s disability benefits were
property under the first step of the test, in which the interest must be a
“presently existing, enforceable right,” noting that the defendant “had no
concrete, enforceable right to those benefits unless and until” he was in a
disabling accident.177 Further, Justice Zarella added that the legislature
could have modified or terminated the defendant’s rights to the benefits at
its discretion,178 thereby making his right to the benefits even more illusory
and demonstrating that he had no enforceable right to anything until he
suffered a disability. This is dissimilar from previous cases where an
enforceable contract right was created with a private employer. As such,
Justice Zarella concluded that to attempt to define the defendant’s right as
“presently existing[] [and] enforceable” would be to “stretch the meaning
of these words beyond the breaking point.”179
Although the existence of a presently existing, legally enforceable
right is sufficient to constitute equitably distributable property under
section 46b-81, it is not necessary.180 Therefore, the court turned to the
second step of the test and analyzed the nature of the contingency to
172
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determine if it was sufficiently probable to constitute property.181
assessing the existence of this step, the court stated:

In

A potential disability is, by its very nature, an accidental
event that every employee and employer strives to avoid. It
is difficult to perceive how a property interest tied to such an
occurrence is “sufficiently concrete, reasonable and
justifiable”; to treat any benefits that might accrue, if the
accident eventually occurs and is serious enough to cause
permanent disability, as a presently existing property interest
eligible for equitable distribution at the time of dissolution.182
The court compared the situation in the instant case to the precedents,
finding that these disability benefits were more unpredictable and less
certain than the income expected to result from the obtainment of a
medical degree in Simmons, for instance.183
In an unexpected turn, the Court seemed to unknowingly add another
step to the two-step test. Justice Zarella added that even if the disability
benefits were sufficiently concrete to constitute distributable property, it
would still not be classified as such due to the particular facts of the
case.184 He then appeared to assert the newly created third step, stating: “A
benefit derived from an injury occurring years after dissolution, meant
solely to compensate for the loss of future wages, simply does not
represent the ‘fruits’ of the marital partnership that § 46b-81 is designed to
equitably parse.”185 This statement seems to suggest that the court created
an additional step that must be satisfied to constitute marital property
subject to distribution, a standard that will fittingly be referred to as the
“fruits of the marriage” requirement. This step arguably relies on two
main considerations: (1) the temporal relationship between the property
and the marriage, and (2) the ultimate purpose of the property.
The court concluded its opinion by finding that the portion of the
defendant’s retirement benefit attributable to his years of service was
subject to equitable distribution.186 It found that such a decision conformed
to the court’s holding in Bender that pension benefits served as deferred
compensation earned during the marriage, which was reasonably
quantifiable.187 On the other hand, the court found that the portion of the
defendant’s benefit attributable to his disability was too speculative to
constitute marital property and too unpredictable to be considered deferred
181
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income, yet served as compensation for future lost wages.
Ultimately,
the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to forty percent of the
defendant’s regular retirement benefits and none of his disability
benefits.189
The dissenters, Justices Norcott and Katz, argued that the decision
should not have even proceeded beyond the first step of the Bender test
because it was a presently existing and legally enforceable right.190 Citing
the statutory language relevant to the defendant’s benefits, Connecticut
General Statutes section 5-192p, the dissent argued that even though the
actual retrieval of the benefits was contingent on him becoming disabled,
he had a vested right to them from his first day of employment with the
State of Connecticut, which the legislature could not simply revoke at its
discretion.191 The dissenters drew the distinction in the application of the
rule, stating that “presently existing and [legally] enforceable” did not also
mean that the party had to have the right to immediate “receipt and
enjoyment of the benefit, or even an unconditional guarantee that the
benefit w[ould] be received at all.”192 Relying on Mickey’s precedents, the
dissent noted that those holdings indicated that interests were not reduced
to mere expectancies as long as the party had an enforceable right in the
event that the contingent condition did occur.193 In the dissent’s
interpretation of the judicial history, the likelihood of the occurrence of the
condition was immaterial.194
Further, striking down the majority’s emphasis on the time of retrieval,
the dissent argued that “whether an asset is marital property turns on the
time at which an enforceable right to the particular benefit was obtained,
and not on whether the benefits associated with the interest were received
during the marriage.”195 Therefore, the dissenters concluded that whether
the benefits were received prior to the marital dissolution and whether they
partially served as compensation for future lost wages were irrelevant
considerations in their determination that the disability benefits were
marital assets that should have been subject to equitable distribution.196
The dissent’s opinion completely contradicts the majority decision in
Bender and misinterprets the two-step test. The Connecticut Supreme
Court held that property had to be either (1) a presently existing and legally
enforceable right (the traditional notion of property) or (2) an unvested
188
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197

benefit that was not too speculative.
Despite the fact that the plaintiff
would receive compensation in the event of a debilitating work-related
injury, he did not arguably have any present right to those benefits at the
time of the divorce, and the dissent’s attempt to portray them as such is
erroneous. The disability benefits did not constitute property under the
first step of the Bender test because the plaintiff lacked a presently existing
and legally enforceable right to them. This was a conditional right that was
only triggered in the event of a debilitating injury.
A better way to understand the plaintiff’s lack of a presently existing
and legally enforceable right to the disability benefits is to alter the
scenario. If the plaintiff had never been injured, how would the parties
have divided this unvested benefit? It is unlikely that such a benefit could
or should be monetized. Therefore, although still somewhat unclear,
disability benefits are better portrayed as unvested, conditional benefits.
Since the court determined that the condition under which these benefits
could be obtained was too speculative in nature, it refused to equitably
divide them as part of the dissolution proceeding.198 To heed the dissent’s
stance would overrule the very framework that the court used to
characterize property, as it clearly assessed such unvested benefits under
the second step, which focused on the property’s speculative nature.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MICKEY DECISION:
IS BENDER STILL GOOD LAW?
Mickey changed the equitable distribution landscape by expanding the
test for determining whether an asset was subject to section 46b-81. Not
only did the majority opinion expressly indicate that Bender created a
second decisional step, it arguably also added a third step of determining
whether the asset constituted “fruits of the marriage.” This nondescript
language will undoubtedly open the door to more complicated litigation, as
it could encompass most elements of a marital partnership. Although the
court narrowed this step’s application based on its holding in Mickey, so
that future benefits which do not constitute deferred compensation and
which vest after the finalization of the marital dissolution do not fall within
the “fruits of the marriage” step, the potential creation of an additional
requirement still serves as an elaboration of the already complex statutory
definitions. It could also further complicate the equitable distribution
arena, which already has an extensive judicial history filled with somewhat
haphazard decisions.199
It is likely that the repercussions of this decision will be far-reaching.
197
Bender v. Bender, 785 A.2d 197, 222–23 n.6 (Conn. 2001) (citing Simmons v. Simmons, 708
A.2d 949, 954 (Conn. 1998)).
198
Mickey, 974 A.2d at 663.
199
See supra Part II.

2011]

MICKEY V. MICKEY

977

Any asset that the parties own, whether individually or jointly, could be
construed as “fruits of the marriage.” In this context, “fruits” can be
considered the result or the outcome of the marriage, which appears to
create limitless opportunities for judicial discretion and expansive
interpretations of the concept. By only paring the breadth of the phrase’s
expanse down through its limited application in Mickey, the court has
further complicated the already clouded arena of equitable distribution.
Many questions arise from this language, especially relating to its
extension and analogy to other similar scenarios. For instance, does
Mickey also extend to worker’s compensation? If so, does the court’s
decision on this issue depend on whether the worker’s compensation
served as deferred compensation during the marriage? What about the role
of time? Is the opposing party barred from collecting any money if the
compensated party is injured the day after the dissolution of marriage is
finalized? Should Mickey be construed so strictly or does such a narrow
construction give rise to injustice?
Considering the fact that worker’s compensation is, like disability,
something that people try to avoid, should its receipt always be considered
too speculative to constitute a marital asset subject to equitable
distribution? In this respect, is it possible to argue that Mickey turned on
the fact that there were years between the injury and the divorce? Does the
injury become more likely and less of an expectancy based on the time
between divorce and compensation, or does its sheer undesirability bar it
from being defined in this way? All of these questions remain
unanswered. While Mickey was intended to clarify this contentious part of
the law, it seems to have instead created more questions than answers as to
how it will be applied to future cases and how the arguably new third step
will be addressed and utilized in upcoming disputes.
On the other hand, it is also possible that “fruits of the marriage” could
simply be interpreted as dicta that does not constitute the creation of an
additional requirement. Under this interpretation, in the future, the court
should only utilize the two-step test asserted in Bender when making its
determination of what constitutes property under section 46b-81.
The “fruits of the marriage” language could also serve as support for
the court’s notion that time is an integral element in determining whether
property is distributable as a marital asset.200 Therefore, this language
could memorialize the court’s finding that property obtained before the
finalization of the dissolution of marriage in Mickey constituted marital
property, while any assets obtained after this finalization were not.201
Unfortunately, the purpose and role of this language are very much
unknown, as the Mickey decision, and its impact, is still in its infancy. It is
200
201
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going to take further litigation to determine whether the court intended for
this language to constitute another standard for property or whether it is
merely an extrapolation or interpretation of the already defined statutory
limitations on equitable distribution.
Although it is nearly impossible to predict the impact that this arguably
peripheral language will have on future cases, based on precedent, it is
likely that the “fruits of the marriage” phrase will become an additional
step in the Bender test. Prior to the Mickey decision, the court championed
a broad notion of property, as evidenced by its intentionally expansive
definition of the term in Krafick.202 Mickey, however, narrowed the realm
of equitable distribution by finding that disability benefits were too
speculative.203 The lower courts are likely to interpret this decision as the
supreme court’s purposeful contraction of equitable distribution. As such,
they will probably be inclined to utilize the “fruits of the marriage”
language as another requirement that would achieve this narrowing
function, rather than to dismiss it as inconsequential dicta.
In light of this somewhat flexible and ambiguous language, is there
any room left to argue that Bender is no longer good law? There seem to
be three distinct ways to analyze the status of Bender post-Mickey: (1)
completely overruled through the court’s later analysis; (2) still entirely
relevant in light of its superficial gloss over and facial integration of the
two-step test; or (3) reconcilable due to the Court’s implicit
acknowledgement of a meaningful difference between unvested pension
benefits and disability benefits.
As to the first argument, Mickey appears to extend Bender to its
breaking point. This position would lament that, based on the existing test,
Bender and Mickey should have both resulted in the same decision, and it
would assert that the court’s failure to rule in the same fashion constituted
a per se overruling of Bender. In analyzing the facts in Mickey, both sides
of the argument would presumably agree that Mickey did not comply with
the first step of the Bender test. The defendant’s disability benefits were
not a presently existing, legally enforceable right at the time of the
dissolution of marriage. At the time of the dissolution proceeding, it would
have been outrageous to award the plaintiff part of the defendant’s
disability benefits, requiring him to pay for something that he himself had
not yet received and may never receive. In that respect, it is clear that the
benefit was not legally enforceable at the time of the finalization of the
parties’ divorce, as the defendant had no right to the proceeds until the
unfortunate disabling event occurred, and it would be patently unfair to
label it as such.
It is the second step of the test that is highly contentious between the
202
203
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two positions. Those that assert that Mickey overruled Bender would note
that the court should have treated Mickey the same way as it treated
Bender, that both benefits were not too speculative to constitute marital
property subject to distribution due to their undeniable similarities. They
would fail to draw a strong and defining distinction between the two
benefits and the facts surrounding the cases, which would ultimately
warrant the court’s making an opposite finding. In terms of this side’s
opinion of the “fruits of the marriage” language, it would probably assert
that these words could constitute an entirely new test under section 46b-81,
since Mickey itself serves to overrule the well-established equitable
distribution law in Connecticut.
As to the second argument, while one might correctly assert that the
facts in Bender are extremely analogous to those in Mickey, the court
makes a very slim distinction between the type of benefits at issue in
Mickey and those in Bender. There is, however, one important difference
between how their applicability to section 46b-81 plays out in practice,
which ultimately decided the cases. The cases are distinct enough to
warrant different holdings. The fact that retirement pension benefits
ultimately serve as deferred compensation, while disability benefits serve
as future compensation,204 coupled with one’s likely effort to avoid the
vesting of a disability benefit with the opposite being true for a retirement
benefit, further increases the former’s speculative nature and decreases the
latter’s. In this respect, Mickey and Bender operate harmoniously under
the same framework of a two-step test and assert the same premise that the
level of expectancy and the asset’s function rules the world of inchoate
property interests.
Another way to understand the argument that Mickey did not overrule
Bender is to consider what the result would have been if the decisions
applied retroactively, or if Bender had been decided after Mickey. The
rationale for the court potentially asserting that the Bender retirement
pension benefits were “too speculative” based on the Mickey rhetoric
would look something like the following. Although the court concluded in
Mickey that individuals want to avoid an unfortunate accident which results
in disability, it could just as easily be argued that someone would want to
avoid losing their retirement benefits at all costs. In this respect, one could
assert that obtaining disability is too speculative because one acts in ways
that encourage prevention, while one could similarly find that obtaining
retirement benefits is a near certainty because the requirements to do so are
fairly mechanical. Disability, just like the failure to receive retirement
benefits, requires the occurrence of an event that is outside of the course of
one’s normal activities, thereby making it too speculative to constitute
204
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property.
Individuals who believe that Mickey followed the Bender precedent
would probably define the “fruits of the marriage” language as mere dicta,
maintaining that the two step test has remained untouched and unexpanded
by the court’s finding in Mickey. In their opinion, this language, if
anything, would serve to narrow and define the two-step test so as not to
create an expansive blanket of discretion for the courts. It could also
function as a temporal restraint, constraining one’s property interests to the
time of marriage, which is not a novel limitation.
As to the third argument, it is possible to find harmony among the
seemingly contradictory decisions in Mickey and Bender by identifying a
fundamental and meaningful difference between pension benefits and
disability benefits, which would render the former foreseeable and
divisible and the latter speculative and non-divisible.
From this
perspective, the equitable distribution of marital assets is intended to
furnish the spouses with their legitimate expectations arising from their
partnership. When parties begin to comingle their assets and plan for the
future, they presumably intend to rely on the pension benefits as a means
of financial stability during retirement, and the deferred compensation
through pension benefits, as Krafick noted, become one of the parties’
most valuable assets.205 When parties envision their lives together,
however, neither of their views of the future include compensation through
disability benefits, presumably because a debilitating injury is both
unforeseeable and undesirable.
If the ultimate goal of equitable
distribution is to provide parties with their legitimate expectations of the
marriage, dividing disability benefits is contrary to this objective because it
furnishes the uninjured party with compensation that he or she did not rely
on, expect, or foresee. Parties expect to utilize pension benefits in the
future because they are valuable assets that result from deferred
compensation, money which could have provided a more stable lifestyle
over the years, but was purposefully set aside for retirement. Parties do not
expect to receive disability benefits, however, because they are not the type
of interest that has been earned in the same way that pension benefits have,
and they are not the result of the same long-term sacrifice. As such,
pension benefits and disability benefits should be treated differently during
the equitable distribution process. While the majority in Mickey
acknowledges the inherent difference between pension and disability
benefits by describing disability as an unfortunate accident that people try
to avoid,206 it does not articulate the effect of this distinction on the
ultimate holding of the case. One way to interpret the seemingly contrary
decisions in Mickey and Bender, however, is to find that equitably
205
206

Krafick, 663 A.2d at 371.
Mickey, 974 A.2d at 662.

2011]

MICKEY V. MICKEY

981

distributable property should be determined by the parties’ legitimate
expectations of their marital partnership.
Despite the three aforementioned rationales, there remains some
difficulty in reconciling the Bender and Mickey decisions, a direct result of
Justice Zarella’s potential underlying agenda. As the author of the dissent
in Bender, it was clear that he believed that unvested pension benefits
should have been considered too speculative because there was no
guarantee that the benefit holder would ever receive them.207 One could
argue that Mickey was decided as it was because Justice Zarella merely
wanted to overrule what he believed was the court’s misstep in Bender. In
this respect, despite the fact that he articulates one, Justice Zarella does not
seem to believe that there is any material difference between pension
benefits and disability benefits that would ultimately warrant treating them
differently under the law. It is undeniable that Justice Zarella supports the
Bender two-step test. It is also evident, however, despite his brief
discussion of the differences between pension benefits and disability
benefits, that he believes that all unvested benefits should be treated as too
speculative to divide, regardless of the parties’ expectations or the purpose
that the benefits ultimately serve.
Therefore, I believe that the second argument is the most accurate
conceptualization of Mickey’s relationship to Bender. Mickey seems to
dismantle Bender’s precedent without outwardly overruling Bender,
thereby serving as a de facto overruling, masked by flowery language.
Nonetheless, this somewhat simplistic interpretation of Mickey’s position
in relation to Bender does not seem to fully account for the complexities of
the benefits at issue. One cannot deny that there are unique attributes to
disability and pension benefits that disallow them from being interpreted
synonymously.
Therefore, an interpretation that treats them as
interchangeable entities would be presumptively inaccurate.
Similarly, without context, the third argument, which carved out a
meaningful difference between unvested pension benefits and disability
benefits, seems completely palatable. Justice Zarella’s position, however,
as the author of both the majority opinion in Mickey and the dissenting
opinion in Bender makes this interpretation unlikely. Justice Zarella’s
dissent seems to advocate for an equitable distribution scheme in which
unvested benefits are universally interpreted as too contingent to constitute
property subject to distribution.208 Although a meaningful difference can
certainly be extracted from the two categories of benefits, this was
207
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arguably not Justice Zarella’s intent. The inherent ideological conflict
between Justice Zarella’s opinions in Bender and Mickey is too obvious to
ignore and too intentional to deny.
As such, the second argument is the most likely interpretation of the
court’s purpose in Mickey. Justice Zarella had the opportunity to revert
back to the regime that he had unsuccessfully advocated for in the Bender
dissent, and he took it. Rather than couching Mickey in terms of its
complete evisceration of Bender, Justice Zarella eloquently formulated a
passable distinction between the purposes of the two categories of benefits
that permitted other justices to agree with his analysis and holding. Under
this interpretation of Mickey, the “fruits of the marriage” language should
be interpreted as dicta rather than the addition of a third prong to the
Bender test because Justice Zarella’s opinion preserved the Bender twoprong test as good law and the governing standard for equitable
distribution of property during a marital dissolution. In this respect, the
Mickey opinion only changed the application of that test. Whether or not
the relationship between the two cases proves relevant in the future,
however, remains to be seen.
Regardless of one’s interpretation of Mickey’s effect on Bender, what
is most important is that the court’s jurisprudence continues to evolve at a
fairly commendable speed. Embracing this growth, the court noted that the
Bender decision “expanded [the] notion of property under § 46b-81[] [to]
recogniz[e that] that there is a spectrum of interests that do not fit
comfortably into our traditional scheme and yet should be available in
equity for courts to distribute.”209 In this respect, until Bender, the court
was operating under a set of rules that had not upgraded with the
advancements of the world, particularly concerning the inclusion of fringe
benefits in employment contracts. Property no longer could be described
solely in terms of material belongings, as the traditional regime had
operated; technological advances created the option of liquid assets in the
form of benefits programs and stock options. As usual, the law operated
well behind the changing times until Bender. As such, Bender served to
revolutionize and update the world of equitable distribution by accounting
for the new property interests, many of which are inchoate, while Mickey
was able to narrow this scope so as to begin to define the realm of mere
expectancy that was too speculative to constitute equitably distributable
property.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE STAND TODAY?
All that is clear for now is that Mickey is the governing law in
Connecticut. As such, it seems safe to assert that the Bender two-step test
209
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is alive and well. Therefore, when determining if assets are subject to
equitable distribution under section 46b-81, an attorney must first analyze
the traditional notions of property, and decide whether the asset constitutes
a presently existing and legally enforceable right. If the asset does not
seem to fit comfortably within this definition due to its inchoate nature, he
must then determine whether the property constitutes a contingent, unmatured interest that is not too speculative.
Based on the court’s previous holdings, it is clear that if the asset
serves as deferred compensation, it will typically be considered property
because it would have served as additional compensation during the
marriage to increase the parties’ quality of life if the benefit system was
not in place. Further, benefits like those for disability, which an individual
strives to avoid, could be deemed too speculative to constitute marital
property subject to distribution because of this desire for prevention. The
final factor that the court seems to elucidate is the importance of time. If
the vesting event is a “fruit of the marriage” and occurred during the
marriage, it will probably constitute equitably distributable property, while
events that occurred after the finalization of the dissolution of marriage
will not. It must be noted, however, that the court never proposes the
“fruits of the marriage” language as an additional requirement for the
Bender two-step test nor does it assert that this language serves as an
expansion or narrowing of the current law under Bender. Therefore, the
purpose and application of this ambiguous language will remain a mystery
until its limits are tested in the judicial arena. For now, the governing
stance in Connecticut is that the Mickey decision did nothing more than
supplement the well-established Bender two-step test framework.

